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1 Introduction
Since Krugman’s path-breaking work more than three decades ago (Krugman, 1979, 1980),
the idea that access to a greater mass of foreign varieties is the main engine for trade
between industrialized countries and at the same time an important source for consumer
welfare features prominently in the literature. Being initially seen as a simple shortcut for
a preference-based channel through which gains from trade can materialize, the love-of-
variety effect in the Krugman model has meanwhile become a doctrine of modern trade
theory, which seems to be well in line with the data. For instance, Broda and Weinstein
(2004, 2006) show that foreign varieties have contributed significantly to observed welfare
gains in the US and other open economies over the last three decades of the 20th century.
But should we really believe that availability of more varieties per se renders consumers
better off? There is strong evidence that the magnitude of available consumer goods is
far beyond the mass of varieties that is perceived by individual agents, and this is not
due to the lack of producers’ effort to inform consumers. Rather, their advertising, which
aims at bringing specific products to the perception of potential buyers, renders consumer
attention a scarce resource in modern societies (Simon, 1971). For instance, Love and
Lattimore (2009, p. 155) point out that “the average consumer in an OECD country is
exposed to 3000 ads a day and will ignore most of them”.1 Schwartz (2004) speaks of a
paradox of choice in this context and the literature dealing with this paradox has pointed
to the overload with information as one important factor that can lower the well-being
of individuals when exposed to more choices (cf. Scheibehenne et al., 2010).2 Apart from
its effects at the individual level, limitations in consumers’ capacity to gather and process
information about products can also have important consequences in the aggregate for the
composition of goods and economy-wide welfare.3
It is the aim of this paper to shed light on the role of limitations in consumer attention
1This figure might seem to be unrealistically high at a first glance, but it is well in line with other
estimates on the number of advertisements an average consumer is exposed to per day. These estimates
vary between 250 and 5000 (see Anderson and de Palma, 2009).
2Empirical evidence on the negative consequences of more choices at the individual level is so far not
conclusive.
3Camerer (2003) lists limited consumer attention among the key challenges for future behavioral eco-
nomic research, and recent years have indeed seen a surge in research dealing with this problem. Examples
include Sims (2003), Gabaix et al. (2006), Reis (2006a,b), Falkinger (2007, 2008a), or Anderson and
de Palma (2009, 2012). However, despite its prominent role in many fields of the economics discipline,
limited consumer attention has so far not been at the research agenda of trade economists.
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in an international trade context. For this purpose, we enrich an otherwise standard trade
framework with a simple, analytically tractable model of limited consumer attention that
has been proposed by Falkinger (2008a). In this model, firms have to send a sufficiently
strong signal relative to their competitors in order to bring their product to the attention of
consumers. Sending the signal can be interpreted as an advertising investment. We model
this investment as a fixed cost whose size depends on market conditions, i.e. on the mass of
available consumer goods. For the trade part, we use a new trade theory model, in which
consumers have love-of-variety preferences. Instead of relying on a textbook Krugman
(1980) model, we choose a more elaborated framework with heterogenous firms along the
lines of Melitz (2003). This allows us to distinguish between welfare effects of trade that
materialize due to access to new varieties and selection effects that impact the distribution
of active firms and thus the composition of consumer goods. The distinction between these
two channels of welfare gains is crucial for our analysis. Limitations in the attention of
consumers not only eliminate love-of-variety gains, they also distort consumption towards
imports, which in models that feature selection of the most productive firms into exporting
can additionally destroy the gains from the cost savings involved in trade liberalization
and thus lead to welfare losses.
Advertising in our model captures two views that feature prominently in the literature.
It is informative as it brings products to the perception of consumers. At the same time
it plays a combative role as it aims at diverting consumers’ attention from competitors to
the own output, which may be socially wasteful (Marshall, 1919).4 Crucially, advertising
can only be combative in our setting if consumer attention is scarce, because only in this
case the extent of advertising expenditure has an impact on a product’s perception by
consumers.5 Whether attention is scarce depends on the aggregate volume of advertising
4We use the term ‘combative advertising’ in the interpretation of Garthwaite (2014), who defines it as
a form of advertising that “shifts existing customers between products, and gains to advertising firms are
matched by losses for competitors” (p. 76). In contrast to the term ‘persuasive advertising’, this avoids any
reference to changes in preferences of consumers such as their intrinsic valuation of goods (cf. Belleflamme
and Peitz, 2010). Aside from the informative and combative (persuasive) view, there exists a third view,
which claims that advertising is complementary to a product and thus raises utility of consuming it (see
Bagwell, 2007, for a literature review). In our model, advertising does not change consumer tastes (as, for
instance, in Dixit and Norman, 1978), so that we can use the standard toolkit of welfare comparison to
measure the efficiency effects of advertisement.
5This points to a crucial difference between models of informative advertising in the tradition of Ozga
(1960), Butters (1977) or Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and our framework. Whereas the former strand of
literature focuses on scarcity of information, we analyze competition for consumers with limited perception
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provided by producers relative to the capacity of consumers to gather and process this
information. We can distinguish two regimes. In the first one, the mass of available
consumer goods is small, so that the total volume of information on products lies within
the consumers’ capacity to gather and process information. In this case, all products
advertised with a minimum level of strength are perceived by consumers. We call this
scenario the information-unsaturated (IU) regime. In the second regime, the consumers’
capacity to gather and process information is exhausted and, in their endeavor to reach
consumer attention, firms mutually overbid their advertising expenditures until firm exit
has brought the mass of available products in accordance with the perception constraint
of consumers. We refer to this scenario as the information-saturated (IS) regime.
The distinction of the two information regimes is important when studying the conse-
quences of trade liberalization, which is modeled as a reduction in iceberg transport costs
between two symmetric countries. Thereby, the IU-regime serves as a benchmark of our
analysis. In this regime, attention is not scarce; advertising is informative, as it brings
(domestic and foreign) products to the perception of consumers, but it does not play a
combative role, because consumers have free information-processing capacity and perceive
any product advertised to them. Hence, all firms advertise with minimum strength before
and after the fall in transport costs, and our model reproduces the standard result of gains
from trade in the Melitz framework. If all firms export, these gains from trade material-
ize since less resources are used for the transportation of goods and consumption therefore
increases. As in Krugman (1980) there is neither a change in the mass of available vari-
eties nor a change in the composition of producers, provided that the trading partner are
identical. Accordingly, a fall in the transport costs cannot exacerbate the already fierce
competition for scarce consumer attention in an IS-regime, so that in a setting, in which
all firms export, gains from trade also exist when the capacity of consumers to gather and
process information is exhausted.
Things are different if there is partitioning of firms by their export status. In this case,
gains from trade arise due to access to a larger mass of consumed product varieties and a
positive compositional effect – triggered by exit of the least productive firms and entry of
the most productive ones in the export market. However, the love-of-variety gains from
imports cannot be fully exploited if consumer attention is scarce. The decline in transport
costs would make new foreign varieties accessible. But consumers cannot process addi-
capacity, which in turn may render advertising combative.
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tional product information, given their perception constraint. This intensifies competition
for scarce consumer attention and induces firms to mutually overbid their advertising ex-
penditures.6 The overbidding is wasteful because increased advertising efforts of firms do
not increase the amount of product information in the mind of consumers beyond the limit
set by their perception constraint. Despite its combative character in an IS-regime, the
increase in firm-level advertising needs not be detrimental for welfare; import competition
and more intensive advertising induce exit of the least productive producers and thus give
way for newly imported varieties in consumer perception that are produced with higher la-
bor productivity than the displaced domestic ones. This generates a selection effect which
impacts the composition of consumer goods in a similar way as the selection effect in an
IU-regime. However, with the mass of perceived and consumed varieties being limited by
the consumers’ capacity to gather and process information, the compositional effect is am-
plified and diverts consumption to imports relative to an IU-regime. If transport costs
are significant, the inefficient level of imports and the waste of resources due to combat-
ive advertising can generate welfare losses from economic integration in an IS-regime with
partitioning of firms by their export status.7
Welfare losses in the IS regime with partitioning of firms by their export status leave
scope for policy intervention. A natural instrument for the policy intervention is taxation
of advertising, because it targets the waste of resources triggered by the competition of
6The link between iceberg transport costs and advertising expenditure in an information-saturated en-
vironment relates our model to Arkolakis (2010), who considers a heterogeneous firms model of trade, in
which marketing expenditures determine a firm’s penetration of a market (i.e. the share of consumers, this
firm can reach with its output). However, aside from the link between transport costs and advertising ex-
penditure, the two models differ significantly in both their focus and their modeling strategy. In particular,
Arkolakis assumes that firms can raise their advertising expenditures to increase the radius of information
and to address more consumers. Whereas allowing for such gradual adjustments in the advertising strength
would generate the realistic pattern that larger firms have higher advertising expenditures, it would not
provide additional relevant insights regarding the principle role that limited consumer attention plays for
welfare or the role of firm-level adjustments in advertising spending for the welfare implications of trade.
Therefore, we consider a simpler cost structure and assume that the information provided by firms is a
public good, once firms advertise with a sufficient minimum strength to be recognized at all.
7Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) distinguish two supply-side welfare effects that arise from importing.
On the one hand, there is a negative lost-in-transit effect caused by goods melting away when being shipped
to a foreign country and, on the other hand, there is a positive export-selection effect since it is the most
productive foreign firms who export, so that in a symmetric world the average imported good is produced
with a better technology than the average domestic product. If transport costs are high, the former effect
dominates and importing is associated with a waste of resources.
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firms for scarce consumer attention. Being interested in the principle possibility to ren-
der trade liberalization a success also in an IS-regime, we abstract from any imperfections
that may arise due to unilateral tax setting in a non-cooperative policy game and focus
on coordinated (symmetric) forms of policy intervention. Furthermore, in line with WTO
rules we consider non-discriminatory taxation that treats domestic and foreign firms iden-
tically. In this case, an optimal tax on advertising expenditure can indeed eliminate the
problem of wasteful advertising. However, it is of no help for relaxing the consumers’ per-
ception constraint in an IS-regime and therefore cannot eliminate the inefficient diversion
of consumption towards imported goods. Thus, the optimal tax does not necessarily guar-
antee that consumers are better off after trade liberalization. Put differently, since scarcity
of attention limits the love-of-variety gains in an IS-regime with partitioning of firms by
their export status, trade liberalization may reduce welfare, even if taxation eliminates
excessive social costs of combative advertising. This distinguishes our analysis from other
advertising models that do not account for limitations of consumer attention, and it sets
the stage for a provocative claim: In a world with limited consumer attention a policy in-
strument that aims at securing gains from trade may have to discriminate against foreign
producers, in order to correct the inefficient diversion of purchases towards imports.
In a further step of our analysis we investigate advancements in information and com-
munication technologies (ICT) that reduce the costs of advertising. We conduct two
comparative-static exercises. In the first one, we consider a general improvement in ICT
that lowers domestic and foreign advertising costs symmetrically. In the second one, we
consider an advancement in ICT that extends the range of advertising and thus reduces
the extra costs of reaching foreign consumers with a given domestic investment into ad-
vertising. In this case, the ICT advancement is export biased. We show that both types
of technology improvement are efficiency-enhancing and thus welfare-improving in an IU-
regime, irrespective of whether all or only a subset of firms export. Things are different in
an IS-regime. If the consumers’ capacity to gather and process information is exhausted, a
general advancement in ICT renders firm entry more attractive, and firms in their endeavor
to receive consumer attention mutually overbid their advertising efforts. This aggravates
the problem of wasteful advertising and eats up the cost reduction per unit of advertis-
ing investment, so that welfare remains unaffected by the technology improvement. The
outcome is even less encouraging in the case of an export-biased advancement in ICT. In
a scenario with partitioning of firms by their export status, a relative decline in the fixed
costs of exporting reinforces the problem of consumer purchases being diverted to imports
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with negative welfare consequences. If optimally designed, a non-discriminatory advertis-
ing tax eliminates wasteful advertising and secures the gains from general advancements
in ICT, irrespective of the information regime. However, the tax does not eliminate the
inefficient diversion of consumption towards imports and needs therefore not be successful
in securing welfare gains of export-biased advancements in ICT in the IS-regime.
In a final step, we give up the restrictive assumption that all consumers like and
purchase all goods. Instead, we assume that certain products are worthless from the per-
spective of some consumers and perceiving these products therefore does not induce them
to purchase these goods (see Krugman, 1980, for a similar exercise). This introduces the
notion of ideal ‘varieties of goods’ into an otherwise standard model, in which consumers
have love-of-variety preferences and allows us to formalize the idea of ‘junk’, which we as-
sociate with useless advertising, i.e. the advertisement of products that are worthless for a
consumer. We show that the existence of junk leads to a distraction of consumers’ atten-
tion, and this gives rise to an additional form of welfare loss. However, the main insights
from our analysis regarding the consequences of trade for welfare remain unaffected by
this modification.8
The main message from our analysis is that limitations in consumer attention can
change key insights from the existing trade literature in a qualitative way and may trigger
welfare losses from international integration. Of course, the finding that trade may lower
welfare in a setting with market distortions is not new (see Markusen, 1981; Newbery
and Stiglitz, 1984, for two prominent early examples). However, it is less immediate in
the context of the Melitz (2003) model. As pointed out by Baldwin (2005), there are
two counteracting externalities in this framework – both related to firm entry. On the
one hand, firms do not consider their negative impact on competitors, so that producers
end up being too small and too numerous from the perspective of production efficiency.
On the other hand, firms do not account for the extra consumer surplus of adding an
additional variety to the consumption basket and, viewed on its own, this implies that too
8One may be tempted to conclude that consumers can avoid distraction of their attention by simply
ignoring junk. However, identifying junk itself is time-consuming. To visualize the magnitude of this
effect, we can conduct a simple thought experiment. Relying on estimates from Rao and Reiley (2012)
consumers spend about 5 seconds to deal with a ‘spam’ email, where spam is associated with the illegal
form of advertisement in unsolicited email. Being exposed to 3000 adds a day (cf. Love and Lattimore,
2009) and assuming that at least one fourth of these adds are junk, consumers spend an hour a day for
dealing with useless advertising. This may be an extreme example. Yet, it illustrates that the distraction
of attention due to junk can be sizable.
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few firms are active. The two externalities exactly offset each other in the Melitz (2003)
model, rendering the market equilibrium allocationally efficient, despite the monopolistic
price setting of firms.9 Therefore, international integration simply alleviates a quantitative
restriction, which must be welfare improving (see Krishna and Panagariya, 2000). The
limited attention of consumers gives rise to two distortions that are absent in the Melitz
(2003) model. On the one hand, combative advertising affects the resource base; less
resources are left for productive use. On the other hand, the capacity to gather and
process information confines the maximum volume of products that can be perceived by
consumers. This closes the positive externality of firm entry on consumer welfare and
diverts consumption towards imported goods, thereby rendering the market outcome no
longer allocationallly efficient. Since in an information-saturated regime both distortions
are increased by trade, the resulting welfare losses may outweigh the benefits from market
integration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the main ingredients
of the Melitz (2003) model. Section 3 introduces limited attention and characterizes the
trade equilibrium in the two information regimes. Also, the impact of a reduction in
the iceberg transport cost parameter on welfare is analyzed in this section. In Section
4, we study the role of taxation of advertising. Section 5 deals with advancements in
the information and communication technology. Section 6 shows how the model can be
modified to account for ‘junk’ as an important source of attention distraction. Section 7
concludes with a summary of the most important results and provides a discussion to what
extent the insights from our model can be useful for guiding future empirical research.
2 A model of trade and heterogeneous firms
We conduct our analysis in a Melitz (2003)-type framework with trade between two sym-
metric countries, whose economies are described in the subsequent. Consumers have Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) love-of-variety preferences for horizontally differentiated goods. Max-
9Of course, this result does not depend on the assumption of heterogeneous firms. It also holds for
the Krugman (1980) model, which features homogeneous producers. As pointed out in the literature the
allocational efficiency in these types of models materializes due to the specific nature of external scale
economies (Egger et al., 2015), and the assumption of a single sector of production, which implies that
all firms are subject to the same price distortion (Benassy, 1996). Furthermore, Dhingra and Morrow
(2014) show that the market outcome is no longer allocationally efficient if the elasticity of substitution is
endogenous, since relative prices are also distorted in this case.
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imization of utility V =
[∫
ω∈Ω x(ω)
(σ−1)/σdω
]σ/(σ−1)
– subject to a binding budget con-
straint – gives an isoelastic demand function for each variety ω:
x(ω) =
I
P
(
p(ω)
P
)−σ
, (1)
where σ > 1 denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between the different varieties
in consumers’ utility, which equals the price elasticity of demand in this model. I is
aggregate income, p(ω) is the consumer price for variety ω, and P is a true cost-of-living
price index: P =
[∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
1−σdω
]1/(1−σ)
, with Ω being the set of differentiated consumer
goods.
The economy is populated by L workers, each supplying one unit of labor in a perfectly
competitive market. Labor is the only factor of production and serves as nume´raire in the
subsequent analysis, implying that the wage rate is normalized to one. Labor input in each
firm is an affine linear function of output q: l = ft + q/φ, where φ is firm-specific labor
productivity and ft denotes the fixed labor requirement for overhead services, with ft = f
if a firm is only active domestically and ft = f + fx if a firm additionally exports. Each
active firm produces a single variety and is a monopolist in the market for this variety.
Facing demand (1), firms maximize their profits by charging a constant markup, σ/(σ−1),
over their marginal costs, which are 1/φ in the home market and τ/φ in the foreign market,
with τ > 1 capturing iceberg transport costs for shipping goods internationally.
The mass of available varieties depends on firm entry, which is modeled as in Melitz
(2003). In particular, we consider an unbounded pool of potential entrants who decide
upon an initial investment fe (in units of labor). This investment provides access to
a productivity lottery, in which firms draw their φ-level from the common distribution
G(φ) = 1 − φ−k, with k > σ − 1.10 Each firm has only one draw and fe is immediately
sunk. After the lottery, firms decide upon production. If they start production, they
make domestic profits pi(φ) = r(φ)/σ−f in each period in which they are active, with r(φ)
denoting revenues from local sales that are an increasing function of φ.11 In addition, firms
10Assuming that the productivity distribution is Pareto has evolved as industry standard in the literature
on heterogeneous firms. This assumption is attractive from the perspective of analytical tractability and
has considerable empirical support (Axtell, 2001; Del Gatto et al., 2006). Condition k > σ − 1 is needed
to ensure an interior equilibrium with finite values of key aggregates (see Baldwin, 2005).
11In view of (1) and constant markup pricing, we have
r(φ) = p(φ)x(φ) =
I
P 1−σ
(
1
φ
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
.
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can export to a symmetric trading partner, which generates profits pix(φ) = τ
1−σr(φ)/σ−
fx. With profits depending positively on a firm’s productivity, we can characterize a
productivity cutoff that separates active from inactive producers. This productivity cutoff,
φ∗, is determined by the zero cutoff profit condition pit(φ∗) = 0, where pit(φ) denotes total
(domestic plus foreign) per-period profits of a firm with productivity φ.
Firms have an infinite horizon and face an exogenous destruction probability which
forces a share δ of producers to exit in each time period. Then, abstracting from time
discounting, in the steady-state equilibrium new firms will enter the productivity lottery in
each period until the expected present value of profits, p¯it/δ, multiplied by the probability
of a successful draw, 1 − G(φ∗), equals the lottery participation cost, fe. This gives the
free entry condition
p¯it =
δfe
(φ∗)−k
, (2)
which establishes a relationship between average (per-period) profits p¯it and cutoff pro-
ductivity φ∗.
The zero-cutoff profit condition provides a further link between average profits and
the cutoff productivity, with the specific form of this link depending on how many firms
self-select into export status. Provided that the beachhead costs for entering the foreign
market are sufficiently high relative to domestic ones, i.e. fx/f > τ
1−σ, the model leads to
partitioning of firms by their export status, with only the most productive firms serving
both domestic and foreign consumers. In this case, the productivity of the marginal
exporter, φ∗x, is larger than the productivity cutoff in the domestic market, φ∗, and the
proportion of firms that export is given by χ ≡ (φ∗x/φ∗)−k = [(fx/f)τσ−1]−k/(σ−1) < 1.12
If fx/f ≤ τ1−σ, all firms export, establishing χ = 1. Adding up profits over all active
producers, we get for average (per-period) profits in the open economy (see the appendix):
p¯it =
(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
(σ − 1)f
k − σ + 1 . (3)
The latter equation is based on producers with φ ≥ φ∗ and thus directly related to pit(φ∗) =
0. Hence, it represents a modified zero-cutoff profit condition.
Furthermore, with a constant share (σ−1)/σ of revenues used for financing variable labor input, operating
profits are given by r(φ)/σ.
12Exporting in this model is more attractive for firms with higher productivity. Partitioning by export
status requires that the least productive non-exporter is characterized by r(φ∗)/σ = f , whereas the least
productive exporter is characterized by τ1−σr(φ∗x)/σ = fx. Hence, φ
∗
x > φ
∗ and thus χ < 1, if fx/f > τ1−σ.
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Together, Eqs. (2) and (3) determine the productivity cutoff, φ∗, and average profits,
p¯it. Furthermore, aggregate labor demand must equal total labor supply, i.e. σM(p¯it+f +
χfx) = L, where M denotes the mass of producers headquartered in a country.
13 Using
this and Eq. (3) in Mt = M(1 + χ), we can solve for Mt, which is the total mass of
(domestic and foreign) varieties that are available in the market. We have:
Mt =
1 + χ
1 + χfx/f
L(k − σ + 1)
fσk
. (4)
In a model in which consumers have love-of-variety preferences, the mass of available
consumer goods is a key determinant of a consumer’s indirect utility (welfare), U , which
in our framework equals the real wage, w/P , and, as formally shown in the appendix, is
given by
U =

σ − 1
σ
[
L
σf
] 1
σ−1
[(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
(σ − 1)f
(k − σ + 1)δfe
] 1
k
if fx/f > τ
1−σ
σ − 1
σ
[
L
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
σf(1 + fx/f)
] 1
σ−1 [(
1 +
fx
f
)
(σ − 1)f
(k − σ + 1)δfe
] 1
k
if fx/f ≤ τ1−σ
. (5)
This completes the characterization of the trade equilibrium.
3 Limited attention in an open economy
We now extend the basic trade model of Section 2 to one with limited consumer attention.
Following Falkinger (2008a), we use a key insight from psychological research on human
information processing as the cornerstone of our attention model: “[C]apacity limits and
perceptual gating both characterize human perceptual processing” (Pashler, 1998, p. 224).
This implies a fundamental bottleneck for a firm that tries to reach consumer attention.
One may think about this bottleneck in terms of Kahneman’s (1973) dual-task approach.
Individuals have a certain amount of perceptual capacity and the way in which a specific
13In view of constant markup pricing, a share (σ − 1)/σ of total revenues, R, is spent for variable labor
input in production, whereas a share 1/σ remains for fixed total per-period labor input in overhead services,
M(f + χfx), and aggregate profits Mp¯it. Hence, R = σM [p¯it + f + χfx] and, because of w = 1, variable
labor input in production is given by (σ−1)M [p¯it+f +χfx]. Since each period δM firms must be replaced
to keep M at the steady state level, we have in addition δMfe/(1−G(φ∗)) units of labor required by new
entrants for participating in the productivity lottery. Adding up the three components of labor demand
and using (2), we obtain for the aggregate labor demand σM [p¯it + f + χfx].
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signal from advertising is processed by a consumer depends on the capacity left by the
other signals to which the consumer is exposed. If no capacity is left the signal is ignored.
The perceptual gate determines which signals are processed with priority. It is assumed
that the strongest signals come first. As a result, two regimes are possible: As long as total
signal exposure lies below the consumer’s capacity constraint, there is no competition for
scarce perceptual resources and thus no interference between different signals. If however
the mass of signals to which a consumer is exposed exceeds the perceptual capacity, signals
whose strength lies below a certain threshold are crowded out.
As in Falkinger (2008a), we account for the consumers’ perceptual constraint by assum-
ing that, irrespective of the mass of actually supplied and advertised varieties, consumers
cannot process information of more than M¯ goods, and hence purchase Mt ≤ M¯ varieties
in equilibrium.14 Firms, on the other hand, while taking the capacity constraint as given,
can invest into advertising in order to bring their products to consumers’ attention.15
Thereby, firms must advertise with a sufficient strength in order to pass the perceptual
gate of consumers. Let the minimum strength of advertising that makes a product visible
to consumers be denoted by ρmin ≥ 1. Even without competition for attention a mini-
mum level of advertising, normalized to ρmin = 1, is required to make consumers aware of
a product and its characteristics.
If Mt < M¯ producers enter and advertise their product with the minimum strength
ρmin = 1, all of these products can be perceived by consumers, and hence the capacity
constraint of consumers to gather and process information is not a limiting factor. In
contrast, if more than M¯ firms would find it profitable to enter and advertise with the
minimum strength ρmin = 1, the perception constraint limits the mass of products that
can be perceived by consumers. Recognizing that only those M¯ firms which send the
strongest signal can attract consumers, firms therefore increase their advertising effort.
Higher advertising requirements mean rising overhead costs so that starting production is
no longer attractive for the least productive firms. Firms mutually overbid their advertising
14The assumption of a definite upper bound for the mass of perceived products is clearly a drastic
simplification. In reality, M¯ may respond to stimulus exposure. But this would not change the main
conclusions of this paper qualitatively. The essential point is that scarcity of attention diminishes the love-
of-variety gains from additional imports and triggers competition for attention with negative externalities.
15Advertising provides accurate information about the relevant product characteristics. Unlike adver-
tising models based on the pioneering work of Ozga (1960) and Butters (1977), and, in particular, in
contrast to Arkolakis (2010), the advertised information is a public good, which is equally available for all
consumers in a certain country, if they pay attention to it.
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expenditures up to the point at which the mass of active firms is in line with the consumers’
perceptual constraint M¯ . In sum, the competition for attention drives up the minimum
strength of advertising that is required to pass the perceptual gate. Hence, the equilibrium
value of ρmin is endogenously determined by the condition Mt = M¯ and depends on the
scarcity of attention. Since individual firms in our model have measure zero, they take
ρmin as given.
16 Moreover, if Mt = M¯ no active firm has an incentive to deviate from
ρmin. On the one hand, lowering its advertising strength cannot be profitable for a firm
that makes positive profits when advertising at strength ρmin, because its product would
no longer be perceived by consumers and its sales would fall to zero. On the other hand,
there are no other benefits of advertising for firms in our model than passing the perceptual
gate of consumers;17 hence firms do not have an incentive to advertise at a strength higher
than ρmin.
Limited consumer attention renders advertising an important fixed cost factor. A
tractable specification that integrates this into our trade model is
f = aρα, fx = axρ
α, α > 0. (6)
Thereby, focusing on a parameter domain with a ≥ ax is meaningful in our context.
For instance, the borderline case of ax = 0 can be associated with an information and
communication technology (ICT) that provides world-wide dissemination of information,
such that firms do not have to bear additional costs of bringing their product to the
attention of foreign consumers. In this case, the beachhead costs of entering the foreign
market are zero, implying that all firms engage in exporting, and hence there is no selection
of just the best firms into export status. In the other limiting case of ax = a, the range of
ICT is confined to the local market and firms have to promote their products separately
in the two economies. In the intermediate case of ax ∈ (0, a), on which we focus in the
subsequent analysis, part of the advertising investment, as for instance the set up of a
principle advertising strategy, has a global character, while the other part is location-
specific, for instance due to different languages in the two countries. With ax/a < 1
the mass of available varieties cannot decrease in the process of trade liberalization. By
16See Hefti (2013) for an analysis of oligopolistic competition under limited attention.
17This assumption simplifies our model enormously and helps us focusing on the role of limited consumer
attention – instead of changes in consumer behavior in response to marketing. The assumption is akin
to Bagwell’s (2007) conclusion from reviewing the advertising literature that “advertising often entails
diminishing returns beyond a threshold level, where the threshold level varies across circumstances and
may be small” (p. 1734).
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suppressing country indices of ρ, we acknowledge the symmetry of countries, which implies
that exporters face the same mass of competitors and thus the same ρmin at home and
abroad. Hence, exporters must advertise with the same strength in their domestic and
their foreign market if they want to bring their product to the attention of consumers.
In order to shed light on the role of limited attention in interaction with trade, we
substitute Eq. (6) into Eq. (4). This gives us
Mt =
1 + χ
1 + χax/a
L(k − σ + 1)
aρασk
≡ RHS(ρ), (4′)
with dRHS/dρ = −RHSα/ρ < 0. Mt is the mass of firms that find it profitable to
seek the attention of consumers at a given advertising strength ρ. Thus, RHS(ρ) can
be interpreted as ‘demand for consumer attention’ resulting from decentralized firm entry
decisions. The stronger is the required advertising signal ρ, the larger are fixed costs
ft, and the less firms find it attractive to serve consumers. The ‘supply of attention’ is
determined by the consumers’ capacity to gather and process information. As long as
this capacity is not exhausted, attention supply is perfectly elastic. In contrast, if the
capacity is exhausted, attention supply is inelastic and given by M¯ . Figure 1 illustrates
the link between the mass of attention-seeking products, Mt, and firm-level advertising
expenditure, ρ. The equilibrium values of these two variables are determined by the
intersection of the attention demand and the attention supply loci.
Two cases can be distinguished. If the right-hand side of Eq. (4′) is represented by
schedule RHS, consumer attention is not scarce and the economy is in an information-
unsaturated (IU) regime. The equilibrium is represented by point A in Figure 1. It is
characterized by ρ = 1 and Mt = RHS(1) < M¯ . In point A, there is no reason for firms
to raise their advertising strength above ρ = 1, because this would just increase fixed costs
without a positive effect on the firm’s operating profit. Things are different if the right-
hand side of Eq. (4′) is represented by schedule RHS′. In this case, at ρ = 1 more firms
will enter than consumers can perceive, given the perception constraint M¯ . This describes
an information-saturated (IS) regime, in which firms raise their strength of advertising
above ρ = 1 in order to attract consumers’ attention. Mutual overbidding of advertising
effort drives up fixed costs and establishes an equilibrium at A′, where the decentralized
entry decisions are brought into accordance with the perception constraint of consumers.
Equilibrium point A′ is characterized by Mt = M¯ and an advertising strength ρ > 1 that
is implicitly determined by M¯ = RHS(ρ). Similar to Melitz (2003) the equilibrium in
both information regimes generates a ranking such that only the most productive firms
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Figure 1: Advertising in an IU- and in an IS regime
start production. Less productive firms stay out of the market as setting their advertising
expenditures to a level which makes them visible for consumers would induce negative
profits.
Whether the outcome of decentralized firm entry decisions lies in the IU-regime or the
IS-regime depends on exogenous parameters. In particular, from inspection of Eq. (4′) it
is obvious that the position of the RHS-locus depends on the share χ of exporting firms,
which in turn is given by
χ =

(ax
a
)− k
σ−1
τ−k if ax/a > τ1−σ
1 if ax/a ≤ τ1−σ
. (7)
This renders the iceberg transport cost parameter, τ , and the two ICT parameters, a and
ax, key determinants of the equilibrium information regime. Changes in these parameters
and their consequences for the scarcity of consumer attention are in the center of our
analysis. Beyond that, we are interested in the differential effect that changes in these
variables exert on consumer welfare U under the two information regimes. The next
two subsections look on the role of iceberg transport cost parameter τ . We start with a
comparative-static analysis of transport cost changes in an IU-regime in Subsection 3.1
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and discuss the IS-regime in Subsection 3.2. A comparative-static analysis of changes in
ICT is deferred to Section 5.
3.1 Falling transport costs in an IU-regime
If Mt < M¯ , the limited attention model in this paper corresponds to a standard heteroge-
neous firms model along the lines of Melitz (2003), with production and exporting fixed
costs being given by f = a and fx = ax, respectively. Differentiating (4
′) with respect to
τ yields
dMt
dτ
=
(1− ax/a)Mt
(1 + χ)(1 + χax/a)
dχ
dτ
. (8)
If ax/a < τ
1−σ induces all firms to export, a marginal decline of the iceberg transport cost
parameter does not affect the firms’ decision to enter the domestic or the export market
and therefore leaves the mass of available consumer goods unaffected. This result is akin
to the finding by Krugman (1980) that iceberg “transportation costs have no effect on the
number of firms” (p. 954) in his textbook model of new trade theory with homogeneous
firms. This invariance result does not depend on the assumption of homogeneous firms,
but hinges on the specific property of the Krugman model that all firms are affected
symmetrically by changes in the transport cost parameter. In the parameter domain
ax/a > τ
1−σ we have χ < 1; only a subset of firms exports and benefits from a decline
in the iceberg transport cost parameter. Intuitively, lower transport costs make exporting
more attractive inducing additional firms to enter the export market. From the perspective
of consumers, this gives access to newly imported foreign goods, which raises Mt. At the
same time, the stronger competition for labor triggered by the new domestic exporters
leads to exit of the least productive local producers, which lowers Mt. With a > ax, it is
the first effect that dominates, so that a fall in per unit transport costs raises the mass of
available product varieties (see Eq. (8)).
A decline in τ lowers the costs and thus the resources used for shipping goods across
borders. This exerts a welfare stimulus at the intensive margin, since incumbent exporters
sell a larger share of their products in the market. The intensive margin is instrumental
for gains from trade if all firms export (due to ax/a < τ
1−σ). This can be verified by
setting ρ = 1 and differentiating (the second line in) Eq. (5) with respect to τ :
dU
dτ
=
τ−σU
1 + τ1−σ
< 0 if ax/a < τ
1−σ. (9)
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If only the most productive firms export (due to ax/a < τ
1−σ), a decline in the transport
cost parameter additionally increases the share of exporters and leads to exit at the lower
bound of the productivity distribution, thereby increasing cutoff productivity level φ∗
and making the average domestic producer more productive. These adjustments at the
extensive margins of firm activity generate gains from trade in a model featuring selection
of firms (into the domestic as well as the export market). The respective welfare gains can
be computed by setting ρ = 1 and differentiating (the first line in) Eq. (5) with respect to
τ :
dU
dτ
=
(ax/a)U
k(1 + χax/a)
dχ
dτ
< 0 if ax/a > τ
1−σ. (10)
For sorting out the different channels through which gains from trade materialize in new
trade theory models with and without selection of firms into exporting, it is noteworthy
that in the model variant with χ < 1, total transport cost expenditures may increase or
decrease after a decline in τ . On the one hand, more goods are imported; on the other
hand, each unit can be transported at a lower cost. If total transport costs rise, any
welfare gain must come from the increased variety of goods consumed or the better com-
position of domestic firms. This is different in the model variant, in which all firms export.
Lacking gains from access to additional varieties or from an improvement in the compo-
sition of domestic producers, welfare increases only because of declining transport costs:
Less resources are lost en route to the foreign country, allowing aggregate consumption to
increase.
Whereas these effects are well-known from existing work on heterogeneous firms in
open economies, it is a novel feature of our analysis that, in a scenario with partitioning
of firms by their export status, a fall in the transport cost parameter brings the open
economy closer to the IS-regime, which we analyze in detail in the next subsection.
3.2 Falling transport costs in an IS-regime
If the capacity of consumers to gather and process information is exhausted, the mass of
perceived varieties is fixed by M¯ and the strength of advertising is determined by Eq. (4′),
when accounting for Mt = M¯ . Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
dρ
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
=
ρ(1− ax/a)
α(1 + χ)(1 + χax/a)
dχ
dτ
. (11)
This illustrates that changes in the iceberg transport cost parameter can only have an
impact on the strength of advertising if they lead to adjustments at the extensive margin
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of trade, i.e. if and only if the composition of exporters changes. The reason is that only in
this case, changes in τ alter the incentives of firms to bring their products to the attention
of foreign consumers. Therefore, we can focus on the parameter domain that leads to
partitioning of firms by their export status, and thus on ax/a > τ
1−σ in the subsequent
analysis. In this case, a decline in the transport cost parameter renders exporting more
attractive and the share of exporters, χ = (ax/a)
−k/(σ−1)τ−k, rises. In an IU regime, the
expansion of exports at the extensive margin, would raise the mass of available varieties in
either economy ceteris paribus. However, with a binding perception constraint, there is no
market for additional varieties, because consumers do not pay attention to them. Hence, in
order to attract consumers’ attention firms mutually overbid their advertising strength, ρ,
which induces a proportional increase of fixed costs in both the domestic and the foreign
market.18 The higher fixed costs reinforce firm exit at the bottom of the productivity
distribution, implying that M falls stronger and φ∗ rises by more than in an IU-regime.
A new equilibrium is reached if sufficiently many non-exporters have left the market, such
that the remaining firm population is consistent with the constraint Mt = (1+χ)M = M¯ ,
where the declining unit costs of transport have increased the share of exporters, χ. In
the new equilibrium, all firms again advertise with the same strength, which, however, is
higher than it was prior to the fall in transport costs. This can easily be seen by means
of Figure 1, in which a decline in τ corresponds to an upward shift of RHS′.
Whereas in an IS-regime a fall in transport costs raises firm-level advertising expen-
ditures, with a negative externality on competitors, this does not necessarily mean that
economy-wide advertising expenditures increase as well. The reason is that the least pro-
ductive firms exit the market and stop advertising at all. Noting that total advertising
expenditures are given by Mtaρ
α(1 + χax/a)/(1 + χ) and accounting for Eq. (4
′), we
find that the two opposing effects exactly cancel out, so that total advertising expen-
ditures remain unaffected by a fall in the iceberg transport cost parameter. Still, the
increase in firm-level advertising implies a waste of resources, because the same content
of information could be provided at lower advertising expenditures. The minimum sig-
18This points to a crucial difference between the IU-regime and the IS-regime if there is partitioning of
firms by their export status. In the former regime, fixed costs are exogenous and the mass of consumed
varieties responds to a fall in trade costs, as in the Melitz (2003) model. In the latter regime, the mass of
consumed varieties is constant, and hence fixed costs have to adjust when trade costs fall in order to bring
firms’ demand for attention in accordance with the consumers’ capacity constraint to gather and process
information.
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nal strength that is necessary to provide the relevant information of a certain product is
ρ = 1, which implies an average information cost of a(1 + χax/a)/(1 + χ) per product
variant. This average cost is declining in χ and thus declines if τ falls. Since ax < a,
the global distribution of information to consumers is less expensive than advertising for
consumers of each country separately. International trade allows to exploit this scale ef-
fects in ICT. In an IU-regime, the effect is used to disseminate information about a larger
variety of products so that total advertising expenditure remain constant at the level
Mta(1 + χax/a)/(1 + χ) = L(k − σ + 1)/(kσ). In contrast, in an IS-regime with com-
petition for attention total advertising expenditures are kept at this level by increasing
advertising costs per product rather than increasing the variety of products. Formally,
the resources lost by wasteful advertising in an IS-regime with χ < 1 are given by the
difference
L(k − σ + 1)
kσ
− M¯a1 + χax/a
1 + χ
, (12)
which captures the social cost of combative advertising. The waste increases with a fall in
the unit costs of transport, since international trade stimulates the competition for atten-
tion in an IS-regime and thereby triggers mutual overbidding of advertising expenditures.
Of course, the wasteful competition for attention is not the only distortion induced
by the perception constraint in our setting. Regardless of the level of advertising effort,
i.e. even at ρ = 1, in the IS-regime one important channel for gains from trade is closed,
namely the love-of-variety effect. In a model variant in which all firms export, this is
irrelevant for the welfare effects of a decline in the iceberg transport cost parameter,
because changes in τ do not alter the mass of available varieties in this model variant even
if the economy is in an IU regime (see above). Things are different if there is partitioning of
firms by their export status (due to ax/a > τ
1−σ), where increases in the mass of available
varieties is a crucial channel through which gains from trade materialize in an IU-regime.
Of course, there is a second channel through which a decline in the iceberg transport cost
parameter stimulates welfare in this model variant: The shift of demand from local firms
to imports generates productivity gains. But with the gain from a larger variety missing,
this may not be sufficient to outweigh possible negative effects of higher total transport
cost expenditures due to additional imports. The interaction between limited attention
and falling unit costs of trade leads in this case to an inefficient diversion of both consumer
attention and consumer expenditures to imports. In other words, importing is excessive.
Taking stock, compared with the IU-regime, in an IS-regime two distortions change
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the trade-offs between the benefits and the costs of trade in a setting with partitioning of
firms by their export status – wasteful advertising and inefficient diversion of consumers’
attention and expenditures to imports.19 As a result, welfare gains from trade are not
guaranteed under limited attention.
For a detailed analysis of the welfare effects under parameter domain ax/a > τ
1−σ, we
substitute Eq. (6) into Eq. (5) and differentiate the resulting expression with respect to τ .
Accounting for (11), we have
dU
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
=
U
(1 + χ)k
[
1− (1− ax/a)k
(1 + χax/a)(σ − 1)
]
dχ
dτ
, (13)
with derivation details being deferred to the appendix. We see that the welfare implications
of trade liberalization crucially depend on the interaction between τ and ax/a, which
reflects the range of ICT. Figure 2 illustrates this. Thereby, we consider ax/a < 1 to
ensure that the mass of consumed varieties in an IU-regime does not decrease.20 If ax/a
is low, domestic advertising information can easily be spread to foreign markets, that
means, ICT has a (rather) global range. In this case, a fall in the transport cost parameter
generates a strong incentive for initial non-exporters to start exporting, thereby providing
a strong stimulus on firm-level advertising. Hence, many low-productivity firms are forced
to exit, so that the distortions from wasteful advertising and diversion of consumption
towards imports dominate the gains associated with a higher productivity cutoff, and
welfare deteriorates if τ shrinks. To put it formally, we call ICT global if ax/a < (k− σ+
1)/(k + σ − 1). Then, according to (13), dU/dτ > 0 under global ICT. This corresponds
to the area at the bottom right in Figure 2.
If ax/a is high, the opposite holds. To be more specific, if ax/a > (k−σ+1)/k, we speak
of a (rather) local ICT range. In this case, dU/dτ < 0, according to (13). This corresponds
to the band at the top of Figure 2. A given reduction in the iceberg transport cost
parameter exerts a minor impact on the extensive margin of exporting (χ), and firms will
respond to the fall in transport costs with just a small increase in their advertising strength.
19It is worth to notice that the two distortions are not an artifact following from our simple modeling
of the perception constraint, with a definite limit on the perceptual capacity. They emerge quite generally
if perception of additional varieties deteriorates when the supply of varieties reaches a certain level. The
deterioration of perception will trigger competition for attention and depress the love-of-variety gains from
trade.
20We focus on ax/a > τ
1−σ and hence on a parameter domain that generates partitioning of firms by
their export status in the subsequent discussion, because we already know from above that welfare increases
if τ declines, when all firms export.
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Hence, the distortions from wasteful advertising and excessive importing are small, so that
gains from trade materialize through the increase in the cutoff productivity level. Finally,
if ICT has an intermediate range, i.e. if (k − σ + 1)/k > ax/a > (k − σ + 1)/(k + σ − 1),
we can identify a critical transport cost level21
τ¯ ≡
(
a
ax
) 1
σ−1
[
1
(a/ax) [k/(σ − 1)− 1]− k/(σ − 1)
] 1
k
, (14)
such that dU/dτ >,=, < 0 if τ >,=, < τ¯ . Put differently, a decline in the iceberg transport
cost parameter exerts a negative (positive) welfare effect if transport costs have been high
(low) initially. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
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Figure 2: Welfare effects of changes in the iceberg transport cost parameter
The following proposition rounds off the formal discussion in this and the former
subsection by summarizing the main insights in a non-technical way.
Proposition 1. Let ax/a > τ
1−σ and hence partitioning of firms by their export status.
Then, a fall in iceberg transport costs may have negative welfare effects in an information-
21Setting the bracket term on the right-hand side of (13) equal to zero and solving the respective
expression for χ yields χ = (a/ax)[k/(σ − 1) − 1] − k/(σ − 1). Substitution of χ = [(ax/a)τσ−1]−k/(σ−1),
then establishes Eq. (14), with τ > (a/ax)
1/(σ−1) being necessary for χ < 1.
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saturated regime. Firms, in an endeavor to attract consumers’ attention, raise their ad-
vertising expenditures. Moreover, the exit of low productivity firms leads to inefficient
diversion of demand to imported goods, since love-of-variety gains from trade do not ma-
terialize under limited attention. This is in contrast to an information-unsaturated regime,
in which a decline in transport costs always generates welfare gains. If ax/a ≤ τ1−σ, then
all firms export and a decline in the iceberg transport cost parameter increases welfare in
both the information-unsaturated and the information-saturated regime.
Arkolakis et al. (2012) have pointed out that in a whole class of models used in the
new trade theory, including among others Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum (2002),
and Melitz (2003), the change in welfare in an open economy is directly linked to the
change in the share of domestic expenditure, prompting the authors to conclude that
the channels through which the gains from trade materialize are not too different in the
various theoretical models contributing to the new trade theory. Our model qualifies this
conclusion by showing that if the attention of consumers is limited and the capacity to
gather and process information exhausted, the welfare effects in models with and without
selection of only the best firms into exporting can produce opposite results regarding the
welfare effects of trade liberalization.
4 Trade liberalization and taxation of advertising
An immediate question arising from our analysis above is how policy intervention can be
designed to establish positive welfare effects of trade liberalization in an IS-regime. Re-
stricting our attention to non-discriminatory policy measures and noting that wasteful
advertising is an important source of negative welfare effects, we consider a uniform ad-
vertising tax as a natural instrument for policy intervention. Furthermore, we assume
that the two symmetric countries coordinate their policies and implement the same ad-
vertising tax. Focusing on coordinated policies is attractive for two reasons. On the one
hand, it avoids complications arising from non-cooperative taxation in a trade model with
heterogeneous producers (see Davies and Eckel, 2010). On the other hand, coordination
generates the largest potential for welfare-increasing policy effects and thus allows us to
answer the question if in an IS-regime welfare gains from trade liberalization can be guar-
anteed under an optimistic view upon the role of governments in the process of economic
integration.
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For a proportional tax, with tax rate t, the effective advertising costs for the firm are
f = (1 + t)aρα, fx = (1 + t)axρ
α. (15)
Since total advertising expenditures of firms net of tax are given by Maρα(1 + χax/a),
the total tax revenue amounts to T = tMaρα(1 + χax/a). Whereas T is a component of
the fixed production costs of firms which has to be covered by their total revenue, R, it
does not require labor resources. That means, total labor demand is now given by R− T
rather than by R. It is assumed that the tax is redistributed to consumers via a lump-
sum transfer. Thus, their total disposable income is I = L+ T . With these assumptions
at hand, we can derive from R = I the following equation in an analogous way to the
derivation of Eq. (4):
Mt =
1 + χ
1 + χax/a
k − σ + 1
σk
L+ T
aρα(1 + t)
. (4′′)
Furthermore, welfare is given by U = (L+ T )/(LP ), which can be expressed as follows:
U =

L+T
L
σ−1
σ
[
L+T
σaρα(1+t)
] 1
σ−1
[(
1 + χaxa
) (σ−1)aρα(1+t)
(k−σ+1)δfe
] 1
k
if ax/a > τ
1−σ
L+T
L
σ−1
σ
[
(L+T )(1+τ1−σ)
σaρα(1+ax/a)(1+t)
] 1
σ−1 [(
1 + axa
) (σ−1)aρα(1+t)
(k−σ+1)δfe
] 1
k
if ax/a ≤ τ1−σ
. (5′)
with the last bracketed term in both lines representing the cutoff productivity, φ∗, as a
function of the tax rate (see Eqs. (2) and (3)).
If the economy is in an IU-regime without taxation, our model features the well-known
result that firm entry is allocationally efficient in the Melitz (2003) model (see Melitz
and Redding, 2013). Hence, governments that aim at maximizing welfare (5′) set t = 0
in the IU-regime. Things are different in an IS-regime, where consumer attention is a
scarce resource. In this case, decentralized firm entry is no longer efficient (see above).
Governments can improve welfare U by setting a positive tax rate t > 0, thereby lowering
advertising strength ρ and thus reducing wasteful competition for attention. To be more
specific, substituting T = tMaρα(1 + χax/a) into (4
′′), accounting for M = Mt(1 + χ)−1,
and setting Mt = M¯ , we can explicitly solve for the strength of advertising in an IS-regime:
ρ =
[
1 + χ
1 + χax/a
k − σ + 1
kσ + t(k + 1)(σ − 1)
L
aM¯
] 1
α
. (16)
Differentiating (16) with respect to t gives
dρ
dt
= − ρ
α
(k + 1)(σ − 1)
kσ + t(k + 1)(σ − 1) , (17)
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which is negative and thus confirms the claim that a higher tax lowers the strength of
advertising. However, the tax-induced reduction in the strength of advertising does not
compensate the direct effect of a higher tax rate on the fixed costs of domestic production,
and hence firms face higher fixed costs when t increases.22 As a consequence, on the
one hand, taxation of advertising renders production of the least productive producers
unattractive and ceteris paribus reduces the mass of firms. On the other hand, higher
disposable income and the increased productivity of the marginal firm raise expected
profits of the average firm, which makes participation in the productivity lottery more
attractive. These two counteracting effects cancel out, leaving the mass of active firms
unaffected by changes in t. This can be verified by noting that an IS-regime leads to
an advertising strength which makes entry consistent with M = M¯(1 + χ)−1, where χ is
invariant to a uniform advertising tax. Finally, setting Mt = M¯ in (4
′′), solving for L+ T
and substituting the resulting expression in (5′), we see that
sgn
[
dU
dt
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
]
= sgn
[
α
ρ
dρ
dt
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
+
1
1 + t
]
, (18)
which, in view of (17), is positive, since k > σ − 1 holds by assumption. Hence, in an IS-
regime the considered tax instrument is a remedy for the problem of wasteful advertising,
and thereby generates positive welfare effects.
Putting together our insights from the policy analysis, we conclude that the welfare-
maximizing (non-negative) advertising tax is zero if an IU-regime results in the pre-tax
equilibrium, and it is given by23
tˆ =
L(k − σ + 1)− σkM¯a(1 + χax/a)/(1 + χ)
(k + 1)(σ − 1)M¯a(1 + χax/a)/(1 + χ) > 0, (19)
otherwise. So far, the results in this section are the same for the model variants with and
without partitioning of firms by their export status. This changes, when we consider the
impact of adjustments in the iceberg transport cost parameter on the optimal tax rate
in Eq. (19). Since the optimal tax corrects for excessive advertising, a pressure to adjust
tˆ can only materialize if without taxation firms would have adjusted their advertising
22Substituting (16) into f = aρα(1 + t) and differentiating the resulting expression with respect to t
gives df/dt > 0, since k > σ − 1 holds by assumption.
23The optimal tax in an IS-regime is characterized by the conditions Mt = M¯ and ρ = 1, and it follows
from solving Eq. (16) for t. Using (4′′), Eq. (19) can be rewritten as tˆ = σk(Ltˆ−T )/[(k+1)(σ−1)(L+T )],
which is positive, as the revenue of taxing fixed labor input in advertising, T , is smaller than taxing all
labor, tˆL.
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strength ρ to the changes in τ . As outlined in the previous section, this is only possible in
an IS-regime with χ < 1. Otherwise, signal strength ρ would not be affected by changes
in τ . Differentiation of Eq. (19) gives dtˆ/dτ < 0, implying that in an IS-regime with
χ < 1, governments should raise advertising taxes in response to economic integration
in order to correct for the social waste of combative advertising, which, according to Eq.
(12), increases if transport costs fall. The increase in tˆ points to a new channel through
which gains from trade can materialize in an IS-regime if χ < 1: higher revenues from
advertising taxation. All other things equal, the advertising tax therefore renders positive
welfare effects of a transport cost reduction more likely.
However, as shown in the appendix, the optimal tax response to a given change in τ
needs not be sufficient for generating positive welfare effects of economic integration, in
particular if M¯ is relatively low and τ high initially. This might not be surprising at a
first glance, because with ax/a > τ
1−σ our model features two distortions that generate
waste, excessive (combative) advertising and excessive importing. Therefore, a single
instrument can a priori not be expected to correct both distortions. However, the two
distortions are not independent and both of them are rooted in the limitations of consumer
attention. The reason why an optimally designed advertising tax can fail to secure welfare
gains of economic integration is that it does not alleviate the perception constraint. As
long as this constraint cannot be directly addressed by policy, a successful intervention
may require a discriminatory instrument that allows to correct for excessive importing in
addition to wasteful advertising. Candidates for such an instrument are an import tariff or
a separate advertising tax on foreign exporters. However, both of these candidates would
violate the principle of non-discrimination of the WTO, even if they were implemented in
a coordinated way in the two economies.
The following proposition summarizes the main insights from the policy analysis.
Proposition 2. In an information-unsaturated environment, firm entry is efficient, and
hence there is no need for policy intervention in the form of an advertising tax. In an
information-saturated regime, applying a non-discriminatory and internationally coordi-
nated tax on advertising is a useful instrument to overcome the problem of wasteful adver-
tising. If there is partitioning of firms by their export status, the optimal tax rate increases
with economic integration. The instrument is, however, of no help for eliminating the in-
efficient diversion of consumer purchases to imports under limited attention. Hence, as
long as policy intervention accords with the principle of non-discrimination, welfare gains
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from a transport cost reduction are not guaranteed in an IS-regime with χ < 1 even if
governments set the advertising tax optimally.
5 Advancements in information and communication tech-
nology
In the previous two sections, we have studied the consequences of trade liberalization
for optimal taxation and consumer welfare. Thereby, we have shown that the available
ICT for the distribution of advertisements is a key determinant of the welfare effects of
international integration under limited consumer attention. In the last two decades, ICT
itself has been subject to significant changes, with the respective changes being interpreted
in the literature as an important stimulus for economic growth (Jorgenson and Vu, 2005;
Venturini, 2009) and international trade (Freund and Weinhold, 2004; Fink et al., 2005).
It is therefore worthwhile to look at the impact that changes in ICT exert on welfare in
our model with limited consumer attention. To shed light on this issue, we distinguish
between general ICT advancements, which affect domestic and foreign costs of advertising
symmetrically, and advancements that reduce in particular the extra costs of targeting
foreign consumers. In our model, the former means that a and ax decline pari passu, while
the latter is associated with a decline in ax for a given a.
We start with a discussion of general advancements in ICT. A proportional reduction
in the fixed cost parameters a and ax lowers, for a given signal strength ρ, firm-level
advertising expenditure. This renders firm entry in the domestic and the export market
more attractive, without changing the relative attractiveness of the two markets from the
perspective of producers. In an IU-regime, the perceptual capacity of consumers is not
exhausted, so that the additional products from new entrants (domestic ones or foreign
exporters) can be perceived at signal strength ρ = 1 and firms do not have an incentive to
increase their advertising effort. At the aggregate level, the decline in firm-level advertising
expenditure is offset by an increase in the mass of firms that advertise in order to bring
their products to the attention of consumers. As a result economy-wide resources used
for advertising are not affected by a general advancement in ICT. But a larger content
of information can now be transported with these advertising resources. This allows
consumers the perception and purchase of additional products which is welfare enhancing,
despite a fall in the cutoff productivity level triggered by the entry of new firms at the
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bottom of the productivity distribution.
In contrast to this, consumer attention is scarce if the economy is in an IS-regime,
and firms raise their advertising effort in response to the technology advancement, as
competition for attention is reinforced by additional entry attempts of firms. With the
total mass of perceived product varieties being limited by M¯ , the increase in advertising
strength eats up all the benefits from the pari passu decline in a and ax, implying that firm-
level fixed costs, the mass of available domestic and imported varieties, and thus welfare
remain unaffected by such general advancements in ICT. Put differently, the benefits from
technological advancement are offset by the additional waste of resources due to an increase
in combative advertising. Introducing the advertising tax from Section 4 can correct for
this distortion and, when optimally designed, the tax would thus secure the gains from
ICT advancement under an IS-regime (see the appendix for formal details).
We next turn to the analysis of biased ICT change which reduces the extra costs of
targeting foreign consumers (export-biased ICT change, in short). The ‘Internet revolu-
tion’ in the early 1990s is a good example for such a change. It has opened a new medium
for advertising, with a much more global range than its oﬄine alternatives. Empirical ev-
idence shows that due to its wider range of information dissemination, the internet has
attracted a substantial share of total advertising expenditures since the beginning of its
commercial use in 1994.24 In our model, these changes can be captured by a decline in
parameter ax for a given level of a. This interpretation is akin to the conclusion by Fre-
und and Weinhold (2004) that “the Internet reduces market-specific fixed costs of trade”
(p. 171).
A fall in cost parameter ax renders exporting more attractive. In a setting, in which
all firms export (ax/a < τ
1−σ), this increases the prospects of firms symmetrically, and
hence renders production more attractive for all producers. This leads to a decline in φ∗.
In a model with partitioning of firms by export status (ax/a > τ
1−σ), the savings on ex-
porting fixed costs accrue only to high- productivity firms, inducing new firms to start
exporting. This intensifies competition for labor and enforces exit of the least productive
non-exporters, so that the cutoff productivity, φ∗, increases when the fixed costs of export-
ing fall (see Melitz, 2003).25 For the effect of a fall in ax on the mass of available varieties,
24Evans (2009) presents empirical evidence that in the US the revenue share for online advertising in
total advertising has significantly increased between 2000 and 2008, from 3.2 to 8.8 percent.
25Like other equilibrium variables in our model, φ∗ depends on the term 1 + χax/a (see (27) in the
appendix). With χ = (ax/a)
−k/(σ−1)τ−k we have χax/a = (ax/a)(σ−1−k)/(σ−1)τ−k. For χ = 1 this
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we have to distinguish between the two information regimes and the exposure of firms to
exporting. In an IU-regime there are two effects on domestic firm entry. On the one hand,
firms have easier access to the export market, which raises expected profits and thus ren-
ders entry into the productivity lottery more attractive, thereby increasing M . On the
other hand, the attractiveness of starting production changes and it does so in different
ways in the model variants with and without partitioning of firms by their export status.
If ax/a < τ
1−σ leads to exporting of all firms, the cutoff productivity level falls and hence
the share of firms that are successful in the productivity lottery goes up, which further in-
creases M . If ax/a > τ
1−σ leads to χ < 1, there is exit of the least productive producers,
which lowers M . The latter effect dominates, so that the mass of domestic producers falls
if ax decreases.
26 This negative effect on the mass of domestic firms is counteracted and
dominated by an increases in the share of imported varieties χ,27 so that a decline in ax
establishes a positive impact on the mass of available varieties Mt, irrespective of whether
all firm export or not. If ax/a > τ
1−σ and thus χ < 1 welfare increases due to both a
higher productivity cutoff and the expansion of available varieties. If ax/a < τ
1−σ the wel-
fare gains from access to a larger mass of varieties dominate losses from a decline in the
average productivity of domestic producers caused by the fall in the cutoff productivity
level.
In an IS-regime, the equilibrium strength of advertising is determined by Eq. (16),
with t = 0 in the absence of taxation. Differentiation with respect to ax yields
dρ
dax
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
=

− ρ
α
χ
ax(1 + χax/a)
[
1− ax/a
1 + χ
k
σ − 1 +
ax
a
]
if ax/a > τ
1−σ
− ρ
α
1
(a+ ax)
if ax/a < τ
1−σ
, (20)
which is negative, so that each firm advertises with higher signal strength, ρ, when the
extra costs of targeting foreign consumers’ attention, ax, shrink.
28 Compared to the IU-
regime, additional advertising at the firm level reinforces exit of low-productivity firms,
increases if ax declines, because all firms already export, whereas for χ < 1 it falls if ax declines, as
k > σ− 1 holds by assumption, implying that the indirect effect through an expansion of χ dominates the
direct effect through a decline in ax. Note that this argument applies for both the IU- and the IS-regime.
Provided that χ < 1 (χ = 1), the (1 + χax/a)-term always rises (declines) if ax decreases for a given a.
26This can be seen by computing M = Mt/(1 + χ), according to Eq. (4
′) and noting from above that if
χ < 1, then 1 + χax/a increases when ax falls.
27Differentiating Eq. (4′) at ρ = 1, confirms this result.
28Despite the export bias in ICT advancement, the same (now higher) advertising strength is required
in the domestic and the foreign market after a decline in ax. This is because all firms choose the minimum
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thereby increasing cutoff productivity φ∗ ceteris paribus. If ax/a < τ1−σ renders exporting
attractive for all firms, the increase in the advertising strength exactly compensates for
the decline in ax leaving the fixed costs of firms unaffected. Hence, the combined effect
of the decline in ax and the increase in ρ on the cutoff productivity level is zero, so that
neither the mass nor the composition of firms is affected by the decline in ax in this case.
As an immediate consequence of this, welfare also remains unaffected when ax declines in
an IS-regime with χ = 1.
Things are different if ax/a > τ
1−σ leads to partitioning of firms by their export status.
In this case, the now stronger selection at the bottom of the productivity distribution in
the IU-regime gives an additional welfare stimulus, which, however, is counteracted by an
efficiency loss stemming from wasteful advertising and inefficient diversion of purchases
towards foreign goods. The latter comes from the fact that the rising imports induce
additional transport cost expenditures, on the one hand, but scarcity of consumer attention
does not allow to exploit the love-of-variety gains, on the other hand. As shown in the
appendix, the two negative distortions – wasteful advertising and diversion of purchases
towards imports – dominate in our model, so that an export-biased advancement in ICT
leads to a welfare loss in an IS-regime if χ < 1. Following the reasoning in Section 4,
a non-discriminatory advertising tax needs not be successful in making an export-biased
advancement in ICT beneficial, because it is not suited to target the distortionary diversion
of purchases to imports when attention is scarce.29
The following proposition summarizes the main insights from our analysis in this sec-
tion.
Proposition 3. A general advancement in ICT raises welfare in an IU-regime and leaves
welfare unaffected in an IS-regime. An ICT advancement that is biased towards inter-
national trade, lowers the fixed costs of exporting and thus generates welfare gains in an
IU-regime. In an IS-regime, it intensifies competition for scarce consumer attention and
induces wasteful advertising. If all firms export, this eats up all the benefits from the ICT
advancement, so that welfare remains unaffected. With partitioning of firms by their ex-
port status, it additionally diverts demand to imported goods, thereby lowering welfare.
In an IS-regime, a non-discriminatory advertising tax can ensure gains from general ICT
progress, but it needs not be successful in securing gains from export-biased ICT progress
signal strength that brings them to the attention of consumers, and, since the two countries are symmetric,
this minimum strength is the same in both markets.
29A formal proof of this result can be found in the appendix.
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if only the most productive firms export.
6 Further discussion
In Sections 2 and 3, we have introduced a perception constraint into an otherwise standard
Melitz (2003) model to study the consequences of limited consumer attention for gains
from international integration (brought about by falling unit costs of transport or ICT
progress). Thereby, we have assumed that consumers have ‘love-of-variety preferences’
over all goods, implying that they purchase all available varieties in equilibrium. Whereas
this is a common property of models along the lines of Melitz (2003), it is restrictive in
our setting, as it rules out one potentially important form of welfare loss in the presence
of constrained perception: Distraction of an agent’s attention by products that he or she
does not want to consume. There is no doubt that we are confronted with a lot of – from
our perspective – useless advertising (commonly referred to by the term ‘junk’). It is thus
of interest to see how the insights from our analysis change if we additionally account for
this possibility. Falkinger (2008b) provides a useful starting point for studying the role of
junk in a limited attention model, and we now show how the model outlined in Sections 2
and 3 can be extended to capture the welfare losses associated with distraction of attention
by junk.
For this purpose, let us assume that there are two types of consumers, i = 1, 2, who
differ in their assessment of goods. Products can be classified according to the utility
they provide to the two types of agents and, for simplicity, we assume that products from
category i are associated with positive utility of consumers i, while useless for other ones,
i.e. for consumers −i 6= i. In this case, consumers from subgroup −i will not purchase
goods from category i, irrespective of the price they are confronted with. If consumers
would have perfect knowledge about all goods, they would clearly pay only attention to the
preferred ones and ignore any advertisements on products they consider as useless. This is
the case put forward by Krugman (1980) to illustrate home-market effects on the pattern of
trade. However, the very reason for why we have an attention model and why advertising
plays a role in the first place is that ex ante consumers are not fully informed about the
available products. Hence, it is impossible to filter advertisements perfectly according to
consumers’ preferences, without paying some attention also to those products which ex
post turn out to be useless.
To see the implications of those principle limitations in their clearest form, we dis-
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regard any filtering and assume that consumers allocate their attention randomly on all
advertisements. For the producer of a particular product, this means that all consumers
must be addressed with sufficient strength to attract their attention, but only part of them
will purchase the product. This gives us an attention model whose properties are similar
to the one studied in the previous sections and, at the same time, accounts for the distrac-
tion of attention by products that actually are useless from the perspective of consumers.
Of course, the distraction of attention does only trigger welfare losses if the perception
constraint is binding, because it is only in this case that attention which is allocated on
junk crowds out attention for products that have a positive value for consumers.
The pure existence of welfare losses due to exposure to junk does not change our
insights upon the role of limited consumer attention for the gains from trade identified in
the previous analysis. This can easily be seen if we consider a situation in which everything
is symmetric: Populations of type 1 and 2 consumers are of equal size, firms assigned to the
two categories draw productivity from the same distribution, and countries are symmetric
in all respects. Then, economic integration will not change the composition of goods from
the two product categories and will therefore leave the exposure to junk unaffected in an
IS-regime. Hence, the only thing which changes compared to the analysis in the previous
sections is for producers, that sales for a successfully advertised product are cut by half,
and for consumers, that only half of the perceived products are relevant for the pleasure
enjoyed by love of variety. For the competition for attention and thus for selection effects
and entry decisions nothing changes qualitatively, so that the insights from the previous
analysis are not altered in an essential way.
This changes if we allow for asymmetries in the two countries’ population of type 1
and type 2 consumers. Suppose, for instance, that one country is populated only by type
1 consumers, whereas in the other country the population is split into one half of type
1 consumers and one half of type 2 consumers. No type 2 firms enter the country that
hosts only type 1 consumers, and hence the consumers in this country experience no junk,
irrespective of how deep international integration is. However, international integration
changes the composition of available products in the country with both types of consumers
with the effect that type 2 consumers experience more junk and type 1 consumers less of
it. With an asymmetry of this form and the perception constraint being binding, fur-
ther economic integration therefore aggravates the attention distraction problem for one
subgroup, while lowering it for the other one. This has two notable implications. First,
the widespread concern that in recent years the magnitude of junk in advertisement has
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enormously increased does not necessarily refer to a general impression of all consumers.
Second, there are two counteracting effects on the distraction of attention with the to-
tal implications for aggregate welfare depending inter alia on the relative size of the two
subgroups of consumers.30
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced the idea of limited consumer attention into a new trade the-
ory model with love-of-variety preferences and heterogeneous firms. In this setting, we
have shown that access to new foreign varieties does not necessarily provide gains from
trade. The existence of a positive welfare effect from trade liberalization crucially depends
on whether an economy is in an information-unsaturated or in an information-saturated
regime and whether there is selection of firms into exporting or not. If all firms export,
trade liberalization is always welfare improving, irrespective of how much information con-
sumers are exposed to. Things are different if there is selection of only the best firms into
exporting. In this case, a decline in transport costs raises both the mass of consumed
varieties and the cutoff productivity level in an information unsaturated regime, thereby
triggering positive welfare effects as in other new trade theory models with heterogeneous
producers.
In an information-saturated regime, firms raise their advertising expenditures in re-
sponse to lower transport costs in order to reach consumers in the then fiercer competition
for their limited attention. This reinforces the selection effect at the bottom of the pro-
ductivity distribution and leads to exit of the least productive producers, which brings
the mass of supplied varieties in accordance with the perception constraint of consumers.
Whereas the rise in the productivity level of active firms is beneficial, the increased ad-
vertising efforts of firms – which triggered the additional selection effects – are a waste of
resources; they do not expand the set of products perceived by consumers, which is limited
by the consumers’ capacity to gather and process information in an information-saturated
regime. The negative effect of wasteful advertising is complemented by a second distor-
tionary effect: Under scarcity of attention, the love-of-variety gains from trade cannot be
exploited and compensate for the higher total transport cost expenditures due to addi-
tional imports. This induces inefficient diversion of consumer purchases to imports. In
30A further reason why trade may exacerbate the attention distraction problem is a bias of consumer
preferences towards domestic products.
32
sum, a decline in the unit costs of transport can have negative effects on welfare in an
information-saturated economy with partitioning of firms by their export status.
In a further step of our analysis, we have looked at the consequences of advancements
in information and communication technologies which ease the dissemination of advertise-
ment information. We have shown that the welfare implications of such an advancement
depend on two factors: the scarcity of consumer attention and the export bias in the
technology improvement. If the economy is in an information-unsaturated regime, both
a general and an export-biased advancement in ICT – despite their different effects on
the cutoff productivity level – lead to an increase in the mass of available product vari-
ants and thus enhance welfare. On the contrary, in an information-saturated regime, firms
raise their advertising strength, because an advancement in ICT reinforces competition for
scarce consumer attention. In the case of a general advancement, firm-level adjustments in
the advertising strength offset the direct positive effect of falling advertising costs, leaving
the productivity cutoff and the mass of available domestic and imported varieties at their
initial levels. The waste of resources due to combative advertising eats up all the ben-
efits associated with a general advancement in ICT, so that welfare remains unaffected.
If the ICT advancement is export biased, its implications are even less encouraging, in
particular, if there is selection of only the best firms into exporting. By reinforcing selec-
tion at the bottom of the productivity distribution and diverting demand to imports, an
export-biased advancement in ICT unambiguously lowers welfare in this case.
We have also studied the scope for policy intervention and have shown that setting an
internationally coordinated and non-discriminatory advertising tax is indeed a remedy for
the problem of wasteful advertising triggered by competition for attention. If the tax is
set optimally, the waste of advertising resources can be eliminated completely, whereby
the optimal tax increases with integration. This suffices to ensure gains from general
advancements in ICT. But even under an optimal advertising tax, the problem of inefficient
diversion of purchases to imports, which arises under limited attention and partitioning of
firms by their export status, remains a source of welfare loss. Hence, an optimal adjustment
of the advertising tax to changes in transport costs or to export-biased advancements in
ICT need not be sufficient to ensure gains from trade. The diversion of purchases to
imports provides an argument for discriminatory policy measures, which however would
be against the principles of WTO. In an information-unsaturated regime the perception
constraint of consumers is not binding and firm entry is efficient, so that there is no need
for policy makers to intervene with a (positive or negative) tax on advertisement.
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In an extension, we have modified preferences to abandon the restrictive assumption
that consumers purchase all goods. To be more specific, we have distinguished consumers
according to their assessments of goods and have assumed that consumption of a specific
type of goods needs not be beneficial for all consumers. We have shown that the main in-
sights regarding the effects of international integration from our analysis remain unaffected
by this modification if consumers allocate their attention randomly on advertisements and
everything is symmetric. However, the existence of junk – this means advertisement in-
formation about products which are useless for a consumer – clearly leads to additional
welfare losses in an information-saturated environment, and in an asymmetric environment
these losses may differ between consumer groups.
Whereas the main purpose of this paper is setting up a simple, analytically tractable
framework for studying the consequences of limited consumer attention in the context
of international trade, our analysis also provides insights for empirical research. In par-
ticular, we show that import of new varieties generates a crowding out of domestically
produced varieties as in other models of heterogeneous firms. However, with limited con-
sumer attention this crowding out may be sufficiently strong to induce welfare losses.
Lacking information on the number of domestic varieties, empirical research exclusively
accounts for changes in the number of imported varieties when assessing the welfare ef-
fects of trade postulated by the new trade theory (see, for instance, Broda and Weinstein,
2004, 2006). This approach ignores the crowding out of domestic producers, and hence
may lead to overly optimistic predictions regarding the existence of gains from trade. Ac-
cording to our model, the size of the crowding out effect is a function of trade costs and
advertising expenditures. To be more specific, the model predicts that the crowding out
effect is strong if total advertising expenditures relative to GDP increase in response to
the import of new varieties (and even more so if the surge in advertising is primarily
due to importers). Taking stock, our model suggests that better estimates for the gains
from imported varieties can be obtained if one accounts for the endogenous adjustment
in advertising expenditures relative to GDP as a proxy for the unobserved strength of the
crowding out of domestic firms.
Of course, all of our results have to be interpreted under the usual caveat that a single
model cannot capture all facets of the real world. However, with the average consumer in
the OECD being exposed to 3000 ads a day (Love and Lattimore, 2009), it is important to
take the limitations in the consumers’ capacity to gather and process information seriously
also in the trade literature. A better understanding of these limitations will lead us to a
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more realistic picture about the consequences of international integration and its challenges
for economic policy. Whereas more research on this topic is certainly needed, we hope
that our analysis provides a useful first step for modeling limited consumer attention in an
international trade context and for stimulating new empirical research on the gains from
imported varieties.
Appendix
Derivation details for Eq. (3)
Let us first consider a parameter domain with fx/f > τ
1−σ and thus χ < 1. In this case,
domestic profits of exporters and non-exporters are given by
pi(φ) =
r(φ)
σ
− f = f
[
r(φ)
r(φ∗)
− 1
]
= f
[(
1
φ
)1−σ
(φ∗)1−σ − 1
]
, (21)
where pi(φ∗) = 0 and r(φ) from Footnote 11 have been used. Note further that for the
Pareto distribution E[φ−z] = k/(k+ z), if k > −z, and use E[φ−z|φ ≥ φ∗] = (φ∗)−zE[φ−z].
Setting z = 1 − σ and substituting the resulting expression into (21), we can compute
average domestic profits of all active producers: p¯i = f(σ− 1)/[k−σ+ 1]. In an analogous
way, exporting profits can be calculated, noting that exporting revenues are rx(φ) =
τ1−σr(φ), whereas exporting fixed costs are fx. This gives p¯ix = fx(σ − 1)/[k − σ + 1].
Since only a share χ of firms export, average total profits are given by p¯it = p¯i+χp¯ix, which
can be written in the form of Eq. (3).
If fx/f ≤ τ1−σ, all firms export, so that total profits of firms are given by
pit(φ) =
(1 + τ1−σ)r(φ)
σ
− (f + fx) = (f + fx)
[
r(φ)
r(φ∗)
− 1
]
= (f + fx)
[(
1
φ
)1−σ
(φ∗)1−σ − 1
]
, (22)
where pit(φ
∗) = (1 + τ1−σ)r(φ∗)/σ − (f + fx) = 0 has been used. Following the same
reasoning as above, we then obtain p¯it = (f + fx)(σ− 1)/[k− σ+ 1], which coincides with
Eq. (3), when setting χ = 1.
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Derivation details for Eq. (5)
The cost-of-living (CES) price index is given by
P =
[
M
∫ ∞
φ∗
p(φ)1−σ
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗) + χM
∫ ∞
φ∗x
(τp(φ))1−σ
dG(φ)
1−G(φ∗x)
] 1
1−σ
=
[
Mk
(
1 + χτ1−σ(φ∗x/φ∗)σ−1
)
k − σ + 1
] 1
1−σ
p(φ∗), (23)
where the properties of the Pareto distribution, which were mentioned above, have been
exploited. Accounting for M = Mt/(1 +χ) and Eq. (4), and noting that U = P
−1, we get
U =
[
L
(
1 + χτ1−σ(φ∗x/φ∗)σ−1
)
σf(1 + χfx/f)
] 1
σ−1
p(φ∗)−1. (24)
If fx/f > τ
1−σ, we have τ1−σ(φ∗x/φ∗)σ−1 = fx/f and Eq. (24) reduces to
U =
[
L
σf
] 1
σ−1
p(φ∗)−1. (25)
In contrast, fx/f ≤ τ1−σ implies χ = φ∗x/φ∗ = 1 and thus
U =
[
L
(
1 + τ1−σ
)
σf(1 + fx/f)
] 1
σ−1
p(φ∗)−1. (26)
Solving Eqs. (2) and (3) for φ∗ and substituting the resulting expression into p(φ∗) =
[σ/(σ − 1)](φ∗)−1, we obtain
p(φ∗) =
σ
σ − 1
[(
1 + χ
fx
f
)
(σ − 1)f
(k − σ + 1)δfe
]− 1
k
. (27)
Using the latter in (25) and (26), we finally get Eq. (5).
Derivation details for Eq. (13)
Let ρ ≡ ρ(χ,Mt) be implicitly defined by (4′). Then, substitution of Eq. (6) for f and fx
into Eq. (5) and differentiation of the resulting expression with respect to τ gives us
dU
dτ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
=
[
∂U
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
× ∂ρ
∂χ
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
+
∂U
∂χ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
]
dχ
dτ
. (28)
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Accounting for (11) and using
∂U
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
= − αU
ρ(χ, M¯)k
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 , (29)
we obtain
∂U
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
× ∂ρ
∂χ
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
= − U(1− ax/a)
k(1 + χ)(1 + χax/a)
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 . (30)
Substituting the latter together with
∂U
∂χ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
=
(ax/a)U
k(1 + χax/a)
, (31)
into Eq. (28) and rearranging terms, establishes Eq. (13).
Welfare effects of trade liberalization under optimal advertising taxation
In the subsequent, we analyze how a decline in the transport cost parameter affects welfare
in an IS-regime if the government adjusts its tax policy optimally. Thereby, we focus on a
parameter domain with ax/a > τ
1−σ and hence the case of partitioning of firms by their
export status.31 For this purpose, we can first note that setting Mt = M¯ in Eq. (4
′′) yields
L+ T
σaρα(1 + t)
=
kM¯
k − σ + 1
1 + χax/a
1 + χ
. (32)
We can also use Eq. (4′′) to compute
(1 + χax/a)aρ
α(1 + t) =
k − σ + 1
σk
(1 + χ)(L+ T )
M¯
(33)
Substituting tˆ from Eq. (19) into Eq. (4′′) and accounting for ρ = 1 gives
T = tM¯a
1 + χax/a
1 + χ
=
L(k − σ + 1)− σkM¯a(1 + χax/a)/(1 + χ)
(k + 1)(σ − 1)
and thus
L+ T =
kσ
(k + 1)(σ − 1)
[
L− M¯a1 + χax/a
1 + χ
]
. (34)
31The welfare effects for the parameter domain with ax/a ≤ τ1−σ and thus χ = 1 must be positive,
because with all firms exporting there are welfare gains from a fall in τ even if the tax rate stays constant.
Hence, an optimal adjustment of the tax rate can only increase the gains from trade in this case.
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Substitution of the expressions above into Eq. (5′) gives
U = B (1 + χ)
1
k
(
1 + χax/a
1 + χ
) 1
σ−1
[
L− M¯a1 + χax/a
1 + χ
] k+1
k
, (35)
with
B ≡ k
(k + 1)L
(
kM¯
k − σ + 1
) 1
σ−1
[
1
(k + 1)M¯δfe
] 1
k
.
By definition, an economy is in an IS-regime if the right-hand side of Eq. (4) exceeds
M¯ at ρ = 1, t = 0. Rearranging terms, we can formulate L(1 + χ)(k − σ + 1)/(σk) >
M¯a(1+χax/a) and, in view of k−σ+1 < kσ, L(1+χ) > M¯a(1+χax/a) as a prerequisite
for an IS-regime. This implies that Eq. (35) is positive.
Differentiating Eq. (35) with respect to τ , we obtain
dU
dτ
= A(χ)
[(
1− (1− ax/a)k
(1 + χax/a)(σ − 1)
)(
L− M¯a1 + χax/a
1 + χ
)
+
(k + 1)M¯a(1− ax/a)
1 + χ
]
dχ
dτ
, (36)
with
A(χ) ≡ U
k
[
L(1 + χ)− M¯a(1 + χax/a)
] > 0. (37)
Note that A(χ) > 0 follows from L(1 + χ) > M¯a(1 + χax/a), which must hold in an
IS-regime (see above). From (14) it follows that τ ≤ τ¯ is equivalent to
k(1− ax/a)
(1 + χax/a)(σ − 1) ≤ 1, (38)
which, in view of dχ/dτ < 0, is sufficient (not necessary) for dU/dτ < 0. We can thus
conclude that in an IS-regime τ ≤ τ¯ is sufficient (not necessary) for a positive welfare
effect of a marginal decline in transport cost parameter τ if the government adjusts its tax
rate according to Eq. (19). However, positive welfare effects of trade liberalization are not
guaranteed if τ > τ¯ . In this case, the first component in the square bracket of Eq. (36) is
negative, and a marginal decline in τ lowers welfare if M¯ is sufficiently small.
Derivation details for Eq. (20)
Setting t = 0 and differentiating Eq. (16) with respect to ax gives
dρ
dax
=
∂ρ
∂ax
+
∂ρ
∂χ
dχ
dax
, (39)
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with
∂ρ
∂ax
= − ρ
α
χ
a(1 + χax/a)
,
∂ρ
∂χ
=
ρ
α
1− ax/a
(1 + χax/a)(1 + χ)
. (40)
If ax/a < τ
1−σ, we have χ = 1, and hence the second derivative of Eq. (39) van-
ishes. This establishes the second line in Eq. (20). If ax/a > τ
1−σ, we have χ =[
(ax/a)τ
σ−1]−k/(σ−1) < 1, which implies dχ/dax = −[k/(σ − 1)]χ/ax. Thus, we can
rewrite Eq. (39) in the following way:
dρ
dax
= − ρ
α
χ
a(1 + χax/a)
− ρ
α
k
σ − 1
(1− ax/a)χ
ax(1 + χax/a)(1 + χ)
. (41)
Rearranging terms, finally gives the first line in Eq. (20).
The implications of ICT advancements
General ICT-advancement
Let us first consider the effect of a pari passu decline in both a and ax. Setting ρ = 1 and
differentiating Eq. (4′) with respect to a (holding ax/a constant), we find that dMt/da < 0
holds in an IU-regime. In contrast, setting Mt = M¯ , we conclude from Eq. (4
′) that, for a
given ax/a, dρ/da < 0, while aρ
α = const. in an IS-regime. The welfare effects of a general
advancement in ICT follow immediately from dU/df < 0 due to k > σ − 1, when keeping
fx/f constant (see Eq. (5)). With f = aρ
α rising in a in an IU-regime, in which ρ = 1,
while remaining constant in the IS-regime, we confirm that a general advancement in ICT
raises welfare under IU and has no effect under IS. Let us now investigate the role of policy
intervention. Considering the same tax instrument as in Section 4, the optimal tax level
is given by Eq. (19), whereas welfare with optimal advertising taxation is represented by
Eq. (35). Differentiating Eq. (35) with respect to a (keeping ax/a constant) establishes
dU/da < 0. This implies that general ICT progress unambiguously increases welfare in
the IS-regime if advertising taxation is optimally adjusted.
Export-biased ICT-advancement
The impact of an export-biased ICT change on Mt in an IU-regime can be determined by
setting ρ = 1 and differentiating Eq. (4′) with respect to ax. This gives
dMt
dax
=
∂Mt
∂χ
dχ
dax
+
∂Mt
∂ax
. (42)
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If ax/a < τ
1−σ, we have χ = 1 and thus dMt/dax = −Mt/(a + ax). If ax/a > τ1−σ, we
have χ < 1 and thus
dMt
dax
= − Mt
1 + χax/a
χ
ax
[
k
σ − 1
1− ax/a
1 + χ
+
ax
a
]
, (43)
In both cases, we get dMt/dax < 0 in an IU-regime. In an IS-regime, we have Mt = M¯
and ρ responds to changes in ax according to Eq. (20).
The welfare implications of an export-biased ICT change in an IU-regime can be de-
termined by substituting Eq. (6) and ρ = 1 into Eq. (5) and differentiating the resulting
expression by ax. This gives
dU
dax
=
∂U
∂χ
× dχ
dax
+
∂U
∂ax
, (44)
which, in view of the second line of Eq. (5), reduces to
dU
dax
= −k − σ + 1
k(σ − 1)
U
a+ ax
< 0, (45)
if ax/a < τ
1−σ. Using (31) and dχ/dax = −kχ/[(σ − 1)ax] for ∂U/∂χ× dχ/dax, and the
first line of Eq. (5) for computing ∂U/∂ax = Uχ/[ak(1 + χax/a)], we obtain
dU
dax
= − Uχ/a
k(1 + χax/a)
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 < 0, (46)
if ax/a > τ
1−σ. Hence, an export-biased advancement in ICT generates welfare gains in
an IU-regime.
In an IS-regime with ax/a < τ
1−σ, firm-level adjustments in ρ establish (ax + a)ρα =
const.. In this case, dU/dax = 0 follows from Eq. (5) and an optimal adjustment of the
advertising tax rate must therefore be welfare-improving. In an IS-regime with ax/a >
τ1−σ, ρ ≡ ρ(χ, M¯) is given by Eq. (16), when setting t = 0, and the impact of a change in
technology parameter ax is determined by
dU
dax
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
=
∂U
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
× dρ
dax
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
+
∂U
∂χ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
× dχ
dax
+
∂U
∂ax
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ(χ,M¯)
, (47)
which – by using Eqs. (20) and (29) for ∂U/∂ρ|ρ=ρ(χ,M¯) × dρ/dax|Mt=M¯ , Eq. (31) and
dχ/dax = −kχ/[(σ − 1)ax] for ∂U/∂χ|ρ=ρ(χ,M¯) × dχ/dax, and Eq. (5) for computing
∂U/∂ax|ρ=ρ(χ,M¯) = Uχ/[ak(1 + χax/a)] – can be reformulated to
dU
dax
∣∣∣∣
Mt=M¯
=
Uχ/ax
(σ − 1)(1 + χax/a)
k − σ + 1
σ − 1
1− ax/a
1 + χ
> 0, (48)
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implying that an export-biased advancement in ICT lowers welfare in an IS-regime.
To determine for ax/a > τ
1−σ, the welfare effects of export-biased ICT progress under
optimal adjustment of advertising taxation, we differentiate Eq. (35) with respect to ax.
This gives
dU
dax
=
∂U
∂χ
dχ
dax
+
∂U
∂ax
, (49)
where
∂U
∂χ
dχ
dax
= −A(χ)
[(
1− (1− ax/a)k
(1 + χax/a)(σ − 1)
)(
L− M¯a1 + χax/a
1 + χ
)
+
(k + 1)M¯a(1− ax/a)
1 + χ
]
k
σ − 1
χ
ax
(50)
and
∂U
∂ax
= A(χ)
[
k
σ − 1
1 + χ
1 + χax/a
(
L− M¯a1 + χax/a
1 + χ
)
− (k + 1)M¯a
]
χ
a
, (51)
with A(χ) being defined in Eq. (37). Collecting terms, we can compute
dU
dax
=
A(χ)χ
ax
[
k − σ + 1
σ − 1
(1− ax/a)k
(1 + χax/a)(σ − 1)
(
L− M¯a1 + χax/a
1 + χ
)
−(k + 1)M¯a
(
1− ax/a
1 + χ
k
σ − 1 +
ax
a
)]
. (52)
From the discussion of Eq. (37) we know that L(1 + χ) > M¯a(1 + χax/a) must hold in
an IS-regime, implying that A(χ) > 0. Hence, welfare increases in ax if ax/a and M¯ are
sufficiently small. This shows that export-biased advancements in ICT may reduce welfare
in our model, even if advertising taxation is optimally adjusted.
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